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THE MYTHS OF MARKET FORCES, MOTHERS
AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT:
THE PARENTAL LEAVE VETO
Maria L. Ontiverost
INTRODUCTION
"I am returning herewith without my approval the
'Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990.""
On June 29, 1990, President Bush vetoed the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1990.2 The Act would have provided job-
protected leave from work of up to twelve weeks under certain
conditions, including parental leave.3 The veto message relied
on two main justifications for opposing the legislation. The
President worried that the costs associated with mandatory
leave would impair the ability of American companies to com-
pete in the marketplace and to create jobs. He also stated that
he strongly objected to "mandating" leave policies, preferring to
let normal market forces, including negotiation and collective
bargaining, fashion innovative, flexible approaches to the needs
of employees.4
t Visiting Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. A.B.
1981, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School;
Masters of Industrial & Labor Relations 1986, Cornell University. This article
was written while participating in the Spaeth Fellowship J.S.D. Program at
Stanford Law School. Thanks are due to Paul Brest, Paul Fassinger, Mark
Kelman, Jayne Lee, Shauna Marshall, Carol Sanger, Bill Simon and Lorie
Campos for their support and comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to
Karen Brown and the Families and Work Institute for comments and access
to early versions of their State Parental Leave Study.
' Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990 (June 29, 1990), reprinted in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 890 (1991)
[hereinafter Veto Message].
2 H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Both the House and Senate have
passed similar bills this session. H.R. 2, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), S. 5,
102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1991). The President is again expected to veto the
bill. Clifford Krauss, House Backs Bill for Family Leave of up to 90 Days,
N.Y. Tn s, Nov. 14, 1991, at Al.
' The Act also would have provided leaves to care for a seriously ill spouse,
parent or child or for the employee's own serious illness. This article focuses
only on the parental leave aspect of the bill.
4 Veto Message, supra note 1, at 890-891.
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These arguments are superficially appealing because they
incorporate the popular myths of "market forces" and "private
employment." In reality, however, these myths do not accurate-
ly capture the dynamics of the employment relationship and the
role of working mothers in America. Even though the costs are
low, the "free market" will not provide parental leave because
market failures allow employers to discriminate against women
and mothers, who are not considered appropriate workers.
Furthermore, our society has made a conscious decision to
utilize the workplace to deliver social welfare benefits, trans-
forming the employment relationship into something more than
wages for work. This article probes for the truth behind these
three myths in the Presidential veto. First, it examines the
costs of parental leave and concludes that they are low. The
second section explains why normal market forces will not solve
the problem, necessitating appropriate legislation. The final
section examines America's policy of using private employers to
provide social welfare benefits.
The overwhelming need for parental leave5 has been ana-
lyzed in detail. Although these reasons are not the focus of this
article, a brief summary provides useful background for under-
standing the current issues in the parental leave debate. The
starting point in understanding the need is an acknowledge-
ment that women, and especially women with children, have
become an integral part of the labor force.6 For all of these
' "Parental leave" is analytically and practically distinct from "maternity
leave." The latter is available solely to women who have given birth and is
akin to a disability or medical leave. It covers the period of time which a
woman needs to physically recover from giving birth. The former is the time
which any parent takes, following birth or adoption, to bond with and parent
the child. For a discussion of the legal and analytical significance of the
distinction between the two leaves, see generally, Pamela Parker Knight,
Note, California Fair Employment and Housing Act Section 12945(b)(2):
Equal Opportunity Child Care, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 409 (1987).
6 Over half of all women with children under the age of six were in the
labor force in 1986, and three-fourths of all working women of child-bearing
age will become pregnant during their career. SHEILA KAMERMAN AND
ALFRED KAHN, THE RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYERS AND A CHANGING
LABOR FORCE 12 (1987), cited in Jennifer G. Gimler, Note, Mandated Parental
Leave and the Small Business: A Cause for Alarm?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 599
(1989). See also Gwen G. Morgan, Parental Leave and Other Child Care
Issues, in GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 279, 283-284
(Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1987); Amy K. Berman, Note, HR 4300,
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Congress' Response to the Chang-
ingAmerican Family, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 455,456-460 (1987); Gimler, supra,
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women, the threat that parenthood poses to their work lives
affects the joys of pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting.' Many
women who have children without job-protected leave, and lose
their jobs, must rely on income assistance before they return to
work.' Once these women do return to work, their income
decreases due to lower wages and fewer hours. Other detri-
mental effects on a woman's career include loss of seniority,
pension, and contacts.1 ° Indeed, a woman's entire opportunity
to advance in a career is put at risk when she decides to spend
time on parental leave.'
If a woman chooses to return to work without taking a
parental leave, however, the negative effects on her child can
also be very real. The lack of an initial period of nurturing and
bonding may pose a serious threat to the child's future emotion-
al stability.' 2 Without provision of parental leave, parents may
at 602. Additionally, women are no longer in careers which assume a second-
ary role to family responsibility. David E. Bergquist, Who's Bringing Up Baby:
The Need for a National Uniform Parental Leave Policy, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 227,
230-231 (1987).
7 A 1991 survey of sex discrimination claims found that employers routine-
ly discharged women from their jobs for being pregnant or taking pregnancy
disability leave, even when the Pregnancy Disability Act protects such leave.
Caution: Maternity Leave Taken at One's Own Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13,
1991, at B1. See also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
8 This leads to $108 million more in public assistance expenditures per
year for these women than for new mothers with leave. ROBERTA M. SPALTER-
ROTH & HEIDI I. HARTMANN, UNNECESSARY LOSSES: COSTS TO AMERICANS OF
THE LACK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 26 (1990).
9 Id. at 17, 20-21.
"0 David K. Haase, Evaluating the Desirability of Federally Mandated
Parental Leave, 22 FAM. L. Q. 341, 356-357 (1988).
", Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, The Politics of Workplace Reforms:
Recent Works on Parental Leave and a Father-Daughter Dialogue, 40 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1988); Catherine P. Colvin, New Perspectives in Parental
Leave: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J.
546, 565 (1987).
2 At the hearings on parental leave legislation, two of the most prominent
pediatricians in the country, Dr. T. Berry Brazelton and Dr. Armand Nicholi,
testified that an initial four-month period is critical because, during that time,
the parent-child attachment process is solidified and stabilized. They testified
that the lack of this attachment can lead to retardation of the child's mental
development and predispose children to a variety of emotional disorders.
Testimony cited in James Carr, Comment, Bringing Up Baby: The Case for a
Federal Parental Leave Act, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 857,
863-865 (1987). See also STEVE KOPPMAN, CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RE-
1992]
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have to choose between providing the basic emotional frame-
work which their children need and the ability to retain their
jobs, support their families, and advance their careers. Because
this choice is so undesirable, the call for some form of parental
leave is almost universal. 3 Disagreement remains, however,
on the form that parental leave should take.
A statute mandating job-protected parental leave has
several design options. Most statutes contain an exemption for
"small" companies, which employ fewer than a certain number
of employees. In addition, the length of leave and the terms of
benefit continuation during the leave may vary. Statutes may
specify the length of employment with a company before em-
ployees become eligible and define the events for which there is
guaranteed job-protected leave (i.e. birth, adoption, illness).
Every statute, however, must provide that leave is available to
both sexes and must guarantee the same or a comparable job
upon return to work. The legislation which the President
vetoed would have required businesses with 50 or more workers
to provide one period of up to twelve weeks a year to care for a
SEARCH, TIME OFF FOR PARENTS: THE BENEFITS, COSTS, AND OPTIONS OF
PARENTAL LEAVE 7-9 (1987).
13 Even President Bush stated "I want to emphasize my belief that time
off for a child's birth or adoption ... is an important benefit for employers to
offer employees." Veto Message, supra note 1, at 890. Some commentators,
however, have argued that mandatory leave will actually harm women
because employers will hire men instead of women, to avoid paying the
increased costs associated with leave taking. See, e.g., Maria O'Brien Hylton,
"Parental" Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price for Time Off, 52 U. PITT.
L. REV. 475, 476 (1991). The basis for this theory of discrimination is the false
assumption, addressed below, that leaves are costly. Id. at 482. Additionally,
there were similar arguments made prior to the passage of laws prohibiting
discrimination based on pregnancy; yet, since passage of those laws, women
have become the fastest growing segment of the labor force. Berman, supra
note 6, at 482. A related indictment of leave legislation calls such programs
"classist" because it is assumed that low income women cannot afford to take
leave. Although low income women do take shorter leaves than higher income
women, one way to address the class differences is through the structure of
the leave statute. Although mandatory parental leave legislation did not
increase the average length of leaves taken by new mothers, it did result in a
decline in the number of women who took less than the medically recommend-
ed six weeks of leave following childbirth. JAMES T. BOND ET AL., FAMILIES
AND WORK INST., BEYOND THE PARENTAL LEAVE DEBATE: THE IMPACT OF
LAWS IN FOUR STATES 65-66 (1991). The number of low income women who
took longer leaves (and leaves of at least six weeks) rose dramatically when
they were provided with partial wage replacement through temporary disabili-
ty insurance. Id. at vi, 75-76.
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newborn or newly adopted child, to care for a seriously ill family
member, or for an employee's own serious illness. The Presi-
dent's opposition to this and any similar legislation relied on the
three myths discussed below.
I. MYTH ONE: "WE MUST ENSURE THAT FEDERAL
POLICIES DO NOT STIFLE THE CREATION
OF NEW JOBS, NOR RESULT IN THE
ELIMINATION OF EXISTING JOBS."14
President Bush's first indictment of mandatory parental
leave was that the costs associated with it would drive compa-
nies out of business. Until May 1991, the costs that such a
statute would impose on employers were mostly speculative.
Then the Families and Work Institute published their final
report of their State Parental Leave Study. This study looked
empirically at the impact of parental leave on employers in
states which had passed mandatory parental leave laws. The
evidence showed that the majority of the respondents experi-
enced neither serious increases in costs as a result of the stat-
utes enacted in their states nor difficulty in administering and
implementing the legislation."5 After briefly examining pre-
1991 cost estimates, this section will examine the methodology
and conclusions of the State Parental Leave Study. Finally, the
reasons that costs are low will be examined.
A. THE Low COST OF MANDATORY PARENTAL LEAVE
Cost estimates made before the State Parental Leave Study
are important because they were utilized in Congressional
hearings on the Family and Medical Leave Act and provided a
basis for the Legislative passage and Executive veto of the Act.
The General Accounting Office ("GAO") conducted a primary
study used in the hearings. It concluded that the only costs to
employers would be for carrying health insurance for employees
on leave."6 The GAO reached this result based on the follow-
14 Veto Message, supra note 1, at 890.
15 BOND, supra note 13, at 65-66.
'
6SPALTER-ROTH & HARTMANN, supra note 8, at 14. See also Haase, supra
note 10, at 347; but see Gimler, supra note 6, at 619-620 (stating that the GAO
study fails to account for costs resulting from decreases in employee productiv-
ity, litigation and penalties for violations, and increases in unemployment
19921
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ing assumptions: employers would replace one in three absent
workers; the cost of replacement workers was less than the cost
of regular workers; and no significant productivity loss would
occur. Other attempts to estimate costs also concluded that
payroll costs would be low.' Advocates on each side of the
issue justified their positions based on the cost effects of chang-
es in productivity. Opponents of the bill stated that temporary
replacements or employees bearing extra work would diminish
productivity. Proponents of the legislation argued that employ-
ees would work harder out of loyalty and gratitude since their
employer provided the benefit.'" On the whole, these esti-
mates, while educated, were nonetheless guesses.
In contrast, the State Parental Leave Study examined the
actual effect of mandatory leave legislation on employers in
Oregon, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Rhode Island. The study
selected state legislation which differed in length of leave
permitted (ranging from six to thirteen weeks) and number of
employees needed to qualify for coverage (ranging from twenty-
one to fifty weeks). 9 In each state, the governor or lieutenant
governor sponsored the study. Representatives from business,
labor, state legislatures and agencies, and women's and child-
ren's advocacy groups designed the study, with the assistance of
a team of national leave experts representing both sides of the
debate.2" The board of experts also assisted in reviewing the
study findings as analysis proceeded.
The first of the study's four major conclusions involved
employer costs. The vast majority of employers did not experi-
ence increases in training, unemployment insurance, adminis-
trative and health benefit coverage costs. The study designers
had expected that training costs might increase if employers
needed to train temporary replacements for the person on leave.
Instead, the study revealed that seventy-one percent of the
insurance).
'7 Haase, supra note 10, at 348-349.
1d. at 349.
'9 The statutes also varied on eligibility, continuation of benefits, and
covered events. Parental Leave Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Children,
Fan., Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human
Resources, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1991) (statement of Ellen Galinsky, Co-
President Families and Work Institute) (available from the Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy).
20 Id. at 3-4.
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employers in the combined four state sample did not face in-
creased training costs. 21  This most likely resulted from the
quality of temporary replacements and the use of internal
employees.2 2 The study group had also suspected that unem-
ployment costs might rise if employers were liable for the
unemployment insurance of employees hired to cover leaves and
then laid off when the original employee returned. Eighty-one
percent did not see a rise in unemployment insurance costs',
probably due to the use of internal employees, who were not
discharged, and temporary agency employees, for which the
agency, and not the company, was responsible.
The planning group had also anticipated that administra-
tive costs might rise as companies developed leave policies and
implemented procedures associated with them; yet fifty-five
percent of the employers studied did not realize cost increas-
es.' An explanation for this result may be that many compa-
nies already had policies and structures, which simply needed
modifying.' Finally, the group had thought that health bene-
fit costs might increase, from covering both the temporary
employee and the employee on leave. However, seventy-three
percent did not face increased health benefit costs as a result of
the legislation.26 Costs failed to increase because temporary
employees generally do not receive benefits, and two of the state
statutes required employees to pay premiums to continue their
benefits while on leave. Thus, the areas which the group had
identified as likely for cost increases were generally unaffect-
ed.27
21 BOND, supra note 13, at 53. Unless specified otherwise, all figures refer
to averages for the combined four state sample.
2 See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
BOND, supra note 13, at 53.
24 Id.
2 Id. at 36-37.
2 Id. at 53.
1 Only four percent reported significant cost increases in training, six
percent reported such increases in administrative costs, and two percent in
unemployment insurance. Id. Since the magnitude of cost increases was the
same for employers covered by the legislation as those who were exempt, the
researchers concluded that the reported cost increases may have resulted from
inflation and other general factors, rather than from the implementation of the
laws. Id. at 54.
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The study's second major conclusion addressed the concern
raised by opponents of parental leave legislation - the effect of
mandatory leave on other benefits. The study had expected
that, if employers must pay more to cover leaves, they will offset
the costs by reducing other benefits. In fact, the study revealed
that only about one in twenty employers provided fewer health
benefits as a result of mandatory leave." This appears to
reflect the fact that few additional costs are associated with
mandatory leave.
The study also investigated the ease or difficulty encoun-
tered by implementing the statute. Ninety-one percent of the
employers did not have any difficulty in implementing the
statute.2 9 Thirty-three percent of employers found it "extreme-
ly easy" to implement; less than one in ten employers found it
difficult to implement."0
Finally, the study investigated the effects on companies of
various sizes. The size of a company was not related to its
difficulty in implementing the statute."' Additionally, small
companies were no more or less likely to experience increases in
costs in the categories studied.3 2 Thus, the study did not sup-
port the assumption that the legislation would dispropor-
tionately affect small businesses.
Concrete evidence shows that Congress was correct in
relying on the available cost estimates in passing the Family &
Medical Leave Act. It also disproves the President's suggestion
that the increased cost of mandatory leave would diminish the
ability of American companies to compete and to create jobs.
The availability of low cost ways to cover the leaves is probably
the main reason that employers did not confront cost increases.
B. THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN
WORKFORCE
Employers cover leaves of absence at very low costs by
redistributing work and hiring temporary employees. In a 1986
' Approximately six percent of the employers provided fewer benefits. Id.
at 59-60.
' Nineteen percent found it "moderately easy" to implement, and thirty-
nine percent found it "neither easy nor difficult." Id. at 57.
30 Id.
"' Id. at iv.
32 Id.
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Catalyst study of Fortune 1500 Companies, over eighty-five
percent of the firms considered leave periods relatively easy to
arrange. To cover the vacancy left by an employee on leave,
these firms usually rerouted work to other employees." The
State Parental Leave Study found that sixty-seven percent of
the employers assigned work temporarily to other employees.'
Nearly one quarter of the employers in the State Parental Leave
study stated that they most often hired outside temporary
workers to handle the work. 5 In addition, the Catalyst Study
also cited the use of temporary employees as a prominent
strategy for covering leaves.3"
The use of temporary workers to cover leaves will probably
continue to grow for many reasons." First, temporary employ-
ees earn less than regular employees.3" This conclusion holds
even when occupation, industry, and individual variables are
statistically controlled; the lower earnings are not due to the
clustering of temporary employees in low-paying occupations or
industries or the result of their age, sex, or race.39 Also, con-
trary to dated stereotypes, temporary employees provide quality
3 Berman, supra note 6, at 461 n.52. Eighty percent of the companies
rerouted managerial work and seventy-four percent rerouted non-managerial
work.
' BOND, supra note 13, at 50.
wId.
3 Berman, supra note 6, at 461 n.52. See also Haase, supra note 10, at
348 (discussing the General Accounting Office study).
' This section argues that temporary employees are less costly to employ
because they do not operate under the same terms and conditions of employ-
ment as regular employees. In demonstrating the reality of this situation, the
author does not condone or advocate the exploitation of temporary employees.
Rather, the reasons for delivering social welfare benefits through the work-
place apply equally well to temporary employees. Additional work is neces-
sary to determine how to regulate the terms and conditions of temporary
employment to eliminate any exploitative aspects. One possible solution,
however, is to have temporary employment agencies provide benefits for the
employees they place. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
' Janet Spitz & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Wage Effects of Externalized Work: The
Case of Temporary and Part-Time Employees 2, 14 (Stanford University
Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series no. 1052, 1987) (available
at Stanford University Graduate School of Business Library). See also Harry
B. Williams, What Temporary Workers Earn: Findings from New BLS Survey,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1989, at 3.
' Spitz & Pfeffer, supra note 38, at 16.
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labor.4" In recent years temporary agencies have become a
main supplier of technical and clerical training to the work-
force.4' Accordingly, not only are temporary employees rela-
tively inexpensive and highly qualified, but they are also readily
available.
Currently, temporary employees compose at least five
percent of the workforce42 and are the fastest growing sector of
the labor force. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that
between 1984 and 1995 temporary employment will grow 5%
annually, compared to a 1.3% growth rate for overall U.S.
employement.43 Surprisingly, temporary employees also serve
a range of occupations and industries that is fairly representa-
tive of the labor force as a whole." Employers hire temporary
employees not only as secretaries and assemblers, but also as
engineers, craftspeople and managers.
The prevalence and growth of temporary employees comes
from both managerial and legal factors. Employers owe differ-
ent obligations to temporary employees and can treat them
differently than permanent or regular employees. In addition to
the lower wages described above, other costs associated with
employment are lower for temporary workers. Most temporary
employees do not receive fringe benefits.4" Employers also do
not have to pay statutorily required benefits (social security,
4 R.B. Moberly, The United States, in 1 TEMPORARY WORK IN MODERN
SOCIETY: A COMPARATrvE STUDY OF THE INTL INST. FOR TEMPORARY WORK
379, 383 (W. Albeda et al. eds., 1978).
41 See RICHARD S. BELOUs, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 31-34 (1989).
42 See Spitz & Pfeffer, supra note 38, at 13. Belous reports that there are
1.1 million temporary workers, out of a total U.S. labor force of 121.7 million
or 0.9%; however, the basis for his figures are solely temporary employees who
receive paychecks through temporary employment agencies. BELOUS, supra
note 41, at 27. Spitz & Pfeffer found that such workers account for less than
one fifteenth of all temporary employees. Spitz & Pfeffer, supra note 38, at 13.
Therefore, temporary employees could conceivably account for 13.5% of the
labor force.
4BELOUS, supra note 41, at 26.
4See BELOUS, supra note 41, at 28; Spitz & Pfeffer, supra note 38, at 13-
14. See also Williams, supra note 38, at 4.
"Paul A. Joray & Charles L. Hulin, A Survey of the Socio-Economic
Aspects of Temporary Work in the United States, in 2 TEMPORARY WORK IN A
MODERN SOCIETY 247, supra note 40, at 262; Moberly, supra note 40, at 383;
Anne E. Polivka & Thomas Nardone, On the Definition of "Contingent Work,"
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1989, at 12.
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unemployment insurance, disability, etc.) to employees hired
through a temporary agency because the agency, as the worker's
employer, pays these expenses.46 Employers also treat tempo-
rary employees as more flexible and expendable, more like
variable costs. Employers consider these employees easier to
terminate47 and use them to cover uncertain demand and peak
periods.48
In these ways, temporary employees increasingly comple-
ment a core, permanent workforce. They enable employers to
refrain from hiring permanent workers until they are certain
they will need them. Additionally, permanent hires are not
made until an employer is willing to provide them with the
protection and benefits required by law and managerial policy.
Temporary employees are, in essence, outside the construct
of the typical employment relationship. They are significant to
this article's conclusions for two reasons. First, they are useful
as a contrast to the typical employment relationship. The
typical construct involves employment beyond the coverage of
short-term work needs and an employer obligation and responsi-
bility to provide resources above simple payment of wages for
work.49 Additionally, the growth of the temporary employee
workforce is a projection of the desire of many employers to
form an employment relationship outside of the typical con-
struct." These ideas help explain why the "free market" will
not necessarily provide parental leave and why the employment
relationship is the proper place to realize any costs associated
with leaves.
46 Joray & Hulin, supra note 45, at 262.
47 Moberly, supra note 40, at 383.
4 Polivka & Nardone, supra note 45, at 12.
49 See generally Beth Stevens, COMPLEMENTING THE WELFARE STATE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE PENSION, HEALTH INSURANCE AND OTHER EMPLOY-
EE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-40, 61-64 (1986); see also infra notes
124-127, 139-147 and accompanying text.
o See generally BELOUS, supra notes 41, 46-49 and accompanying text.
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II. MYTH TWO: "I HAVE A GREAT FAITH THAT
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND MARKET
FORCES MOVE TOWARDS PROGRESS." 51
Since parental leave is not costly to employers, neoclassical
economic theory would suggest, as President Bush argued in his
veto message, that normal market forces would move employers
to provide leave.52 Employers could offer an attractive benefit
for little or no cost, thus attracting the best workers and driving
those who do not offer the benefit out of business.53 This sec-
tion will examine why current market forces will not lead to
universal parental leave. First this section will examine the
empirical evidence of the dearth of parental leave. Then, this
section will present reasons, discriminatory and nondiscrimina-
tory, which explain this result.
A. THE LACK OF COMPANY-PROVIDED PARENTAL LEAVE
Currently, much less than half of all workers have a right
to parental leave. In 1989, unpaid parental leave was available
to 37% of full-time working women and only 18% of full-time
working men in the private sector.' Only 2% of employees
" The President's News Conference in Huntsville, Alabama (June 20,
1991), reprinted in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 842, 846 (1991) [hereinafter "Press Conference"].
52 Due to the principle of adverse selection, the costs of universal parental
leave may not be comparable to those of voluntarily providing leave. With
mandatory leave, the parents seeking leave are evenly distributed among all
employers. However, when only some employers offer leave, people who may
need leave are more likely to seek employment with those firms. As a result,
the costs of providing leave significantly increase for the few firms who
provide it and may become prohibitive. Cf. David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea
Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR
PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183, 219 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990)
(Adverse selection leads to large screening costs for the few employers who
have a formal, publicized just cause dismissal standard). Thus, employers
may not voluntarily move toward providing parental leave because of the
costs.
53 Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 616 (3d ed. 1986)
(Market forces tend to minimize discrimination because the least prejudiced
sellers do not forgo as many transactions as their more prejudiced competitors,
thus the costs are lower and their market share is greater.); Mark S. Brodin,
Costs, Profits and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
318, 321 (1987) (Nondiscrimination laws would appear to be self-enforcing).
"Stephanie L. Hyland, Helping Employees with Family Care, MONTHLY
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work for companies which provide paid maternity leave, and
only 1% provide for paid paternity leave.55 Public employees
fare better, with more than 50% of female and 33% of male
workers covered by leaves.56 Smaller employers and those
with the highest proportion of female employees are, however,
even less likely to offer parental leave. 7 Thus, negotiation,
collective bargaining and other traditional market means have
not led to the implementation of parental leave" for the major-
ity of workers.
Nor is it likely that these strategies will succeed in the
future. In the past, employers have responded only to legisla-
tion. For example, in order to comply with the Pregnancy
Disability Act, employers must provide the same disability leave
benefits to pregnant women and new mothers who are physical-
ly unable to work that they provide to disabled employees.59
LAB. REV., Sept. 1990, at 25. These conclusions are consistent with the BNA
1988 Employee Benefits Survey which found that 36% of women and 17% of
men employed in medium and large private firms (100 or more employees)
were eligible for parental leave. Joseph R. Meisenheimer H, Employer
Provisions for Parental Leave, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1989, at 20-21. The
State Parental Leave Study found that, in the states studied, only 14% of the
employers had pre-statute policies and practices that would meet the require-
ments of the proposed federal leave legislation. BOND, supra note 13, at vii-
viii.
' Payment ranged from one to three days' pay. Meisenheimer, supra note
54, at 21-22.
MId. at 22.
" See Colvin, supra note 11, at 553-554 (testimony of Wendy Williams).
Forty percent of women in professional and administrative jobs are eligible for
parental leave, compared to thirty-three percent in production and service
jobs. Meisenheimer, supra note 54, at 22. The Families and Work Institute
State Parental Leave Study also found that employers with less than 50
employees statewide were less likely to have formal, written policies governing
leaves, and companies with fewer than 21 employees were less likely to allow
unpaid disability leave time. BOND, supra note 13, at 33-34.
' The studies cited here refer only to parental leave as defined in this
article. Other studies showing more widespread availability of parental leave
often do not limit the definition of leave, counting any time off for maternity
including disability leaves, informal practices, and even "leaves" with no
guarantee of job security.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-K (Supp. 1991). The disability leave required by the
Pregnancy Disability Act does not address the reasons that parental leave is
necessary because it does not provide time for parent-child bonding, it is not
available to both sexes (and so affects women's equality in the workplace), and
only requires job-protected leave if the employer provides such leave for
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In a 1986 Catlayst Survey, eighty-seven percent of the employ-
ers cited the statute as the primary reason for providing even
this minimum level of job protection.6 ° In addition, those
arguing that employers are increasingly adopting family respon-
sive policies rely on questionable study findings to support their
position.6" Thus, without legislation, many employees will
remain without the option of parental leave. Although this
conclusion appears to conflict with economic theory, several
reasons explain the current situation.
B. THE BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS EMPLOYING PRIMARILY WOMEN
Using economic theory, some commentators have argued
that a profit-maximizing employer would naturally offer paren-
tal leave to attract better employees at no additional cost.
However, more than one set of management strategies provide
the flexibility needed for profitability in today's international
business environment.62 One management style, sometimes
called the "share" strategy, would likely provide parental leave.
This style views employees as an integral and valuable part of
the enterprise. The work of these employees does not consist
of separate, distinct tasks, which management decides to assign
to them. Rather, their jobs include a wide variety of roles with
the goal of helping the entire enterprise prosper. These employ-
ees have a strong affiliation and identification with the enter-
prise. They have a long-term relationship with the firm and are
motivated by compensation made up of hourly wage, profit
sharing, bonuses, job security, etc. This strategy is profitable
because these employees are productive and are flexible, willing,
disabled employees. See also infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
' Twenty percent of employers attributed the change to competition for
employees with other firms and 12.9% named employee demand. Berquist,
supra note 6, at 255 n.193.
" Paul W. Kingston, Illusions and Ignorance about the Family-Responsive
Workplace, 11 J. OF FAM. ISSUES 438, 442-445 (1990). Unfortunately, no
reliable trend evidence exists because studies, over time, have used inconsis-
tent and incorrect definitions of "parental leave."
62 MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION
32-33 (1984). Cf. Levine & Tyson, supra note 52, at 217 (there can be two
stable, economy-wide equilibriums: one in which firms motivate workers with
fear of dismissal and high unemployment exists or one in which firms moti-
vate with participation and there is a low unemployment rate).
' See generally BELOUS, supra note 41, at x-xi; Weitzman, supra note 62.
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and expecting redeployment and retraining as necessary."
The affiliation which the employees feel with their employer
promotes their flexiblity. Additionally, lower long-term costs,
stemming primarily from a lower turnover rate, outweigh any
short-term increase in costs.65
The share strategy is distinct from the "contingent" strate-
gy, which also provides flexibility and oftentimes profitabili-
ty.66 The contingent strategy, however, makes different man-
agement choices to reach these goals. It treats employees as
commodities and analyzes them as short-term, variable costs.
Employees do not identify with the employer and are primarily
compensated by an hourly wage. The contingent strategy relies
heavily on the construct of the employment relationship used for
temporary employees. Employees do not receive benefits, are
paid less, work for a short time, and are considered easily
expendable. 67 These characteristics make employees flexible.
Employers utilizing this management strategy are not likely to
offer parental leave. Not surprisingly, this management philos-
ophy characterizes employers who currently do not provide
parental leave.'
These two management philosophies, share and contingent,
are equally profitable alternatives with different societal ef-
fects.69  If more employers choose to use a contingent
workforce, the "free market" would not necessarily provide
parental leave. Current evidence indicates that the trend is
indeed in this direction. American employers are slashing the
size of their share workforces and are increasing their use of
contingent workers. 0 Employers are moving towards a combi-
6BELOUS, supra note 41, at x-xi.
' See Arthur E. Blakemore et al., Employment Bonuses and Labor
Turnover, 5 J. OF LAB. EcON. S124, S133-S134 (1987); Daniel M. G. Raff &
Lawrence H. Summers, Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?, 5 J. OF LAB.
EcoN. S57, S82-$83 (1987).
" Raff & Summers, supra note 65, at S57-S58.
6 7 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
6 BELOUS, supra note 41, at x-xi. The share alternative is clearly prefera-
ble from a human relations perspective. MICHAEL BEER ET AL., MANAGING
HUMAN ASsETS 113-115 (1984). Weitzman argues that the two policies are not
equally efficient; that the share approach is actually superior from an econom-
ic perspective. WEITZMAN, supra note 62, at 2-3.
'0 Richard S. Belous, How Human Resource Systems Adjust to the Shift
toward Contingent Workers, Monthly Lab. Rev., Mar. 1989, at 7, 9.
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nation workforce, where they have a relatively small core of
permanent workers and an increasing pool of contingent work-
ers. This structure enables employers to reap the advantages of
both types of workforces, leaving an increasing number of
contingent workers without benefits. Although various methods
for measuring the contingent workforce exist, all of them show
an increase. An averaging of the various methods estimates
that one-quarter of all American workers are properly classified
as contingent workers.7' This move to the contingent model is
especially noticeable in those industries which employ primarily
women.72 Thus, the "free market" is driving these employers
to a management system that does not include the provision of
parental leave.
C. THE BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS WHO EXCLUDE FEMALE WORKERS
Another main reason employers have failed to implemeit
family-oriented policies is that they primarily benefit women; a
strong bias against women workers still exists. 7' This dynamic
characterizes industries which exclude female workers. Society
traditionally views women as performing solely, or at least
primarily, domestic work, considering this work separate and
distinct from marketplace work. 4 Even though women are an
enormous presence in the paid workforce,7 this stereotype is
so pervasive that society views raising children and working
outside of the home as incompatible for women.76 Because of
71 BELOUS, supra note 41, at viii. But see generally Polivka & Nardone,
supra note 45 (the operational definition of contingent employment may
misrepresent the status of a significant number of part time workers).
7 See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
" Joan Aldous, Specification and Speculation Concerning the Politics of
Workplace Family Policies, 11 J. OF FAM. IssuEs 355, 358 (1990). Although
parental leave policies are facially neutral, they are most often used by
women. See infra note 78. Thus, employers who do not want to attract or
employ women would not offer parental leave.
4 Berquist, supra note 6, at 231-232. This stereotype perpetuates econom-
ic and social disparity between men and women. Id.
7' See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In addition to being a large
presence, women are also responsible for the traditional male role of financial-
ly supporting children. Howard V. Hayghe, Family Members in the Work
Force, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 14, 15.
76 Knight, supra note 5, at 409. This same incompatibility is not seen to
exist for men. Id.
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this stereotype, women in the workplace are still viewed primar-
ily as wives and mothers, not workers.77 This view leads to
both intentional and unconscious bias against women, and
especially mothers, in the workforce.7
Many different types of evidence show discrimination
against women workers. Survey data, for example, indicates
that only forty-seven percent of male business executives stated
that they would feel comfortable working for a woman.7 9 Addi-
tionally, women earn substantially less than men and predomi-
nantly work in low-paid, low-status, "female occupations. 80 In
August 1991, the Labor Department released its "Glass Ceiling
Report" which found that various practices exist at most compa-
nies that create a certain level of advancement which women
simply can not exceed." A contemporaneous survey found that
women hold only 2.6% of the executive positions at Fortune 500
companies.8 2 Women's choice of jobs or lack of credentials is
not a cause of the situation; women with similar education,
7 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN 179, 190 (1989); Colvin,
supra note 11, at 559 (components of the spousal unities doctrine still exist as
some employers presume that all mothers receive economic support from a
husband and withdraw from the workforce).
" This bias creates a complementary stereotype for male workers who are
assumed to have primarily money earning duties, to the exclusion of house-
hold responsibilities. As a result, men are not offered parental leave as
frequently as women. Supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. In addition,
far fewer men than women actually take a lengthy leave. BOND, supra note
13, at 76-78 (the average leave taken by fathers was one work week); Hylton,
supra note 13, at 476 n.6. For a discussion of how a father's participation in
parental leave can affect his involvement in childcare after the leave is over,
see Linda Haas, Gender Equality and Social Policy: Implications of a Study
of Parental Leave in Sweden, 11 J. OF FAm. L. ISSUES 401 (1990).
" Other survey evidence indicates that 74% of whites (87% of blacks)
believe that sex discrimination is still a major problem for women in the labor
market. John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the
Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (1989).
Donohue concludes that since women are able workers, "it is difficult to
attribute these findings to anything but misogyny." Id.
80 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 162-164 (1989).
" These practices groom and promote white men, albeit in less visible and
sometimes unconscious ways, for those job tracks which lead to executive
positions. Beth Hawkins, Career-Limiting Bias Found at Low Job Levels, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at Al.
' Few Women in Top Jobs, CH. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1991, at A13.
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experience and training still do not advance as far or as fast as
men.8
The strongest evidence of the existence of sex discrimina-
tion, however, may be the statutes and policies which, over
time, have directly banned women from working. These stat-
utes and policies clearly show American society's antipathy
toward women working outside of the home. Throughout
history, both statutes and employer policies have restricted the
rights of women to participate fully in the paid workforce.
Initially, statutes prohibited women from holding certain
jobs.' The trend of excluding women from certain occupations
continued throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries.8 5
Cases from this period reflect the prevailing view of women as
wives and mothers first and as workers second.86  Further-
more, women were only allowed to be workers if it was not
detrimental to their role of wife and mother." 1
83 RHODE, supra note 80, at 165. Less than half of the difference in wages
result from "human capital" factors, such as education, experience and hours
worked. Id. For a discussion on societal factors affecting "choice," see id. at
165-167.
8 In 1873, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting
women from practicing law, stating that "It]he paramount destiny and mission
of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).
m Colvin, supra note 11, at 560. Within those jobs women could hold,
numerous restrictions limited the total hours and schedule which a woman
could work, the amount of her pay, and the conditions of her work, including
mandatory rest periods. Id. at 560-563. The result of such restrictions was to
exclude women from jobs which were higher paying, contained supervisory
duties, and which provided promotional opportunities, because they could not
accomodate the womens' mandated "needs." Id. at 562-563.
' In perhaps the most famous case of that era upholding an Oregon
statute limiting the number of hours a woman could work each day, the
Supreme Court stated, "That woman's physical structure and the performance
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsis-
tence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are
upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical
fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from
day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers
are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes
an object ofpublic interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor
of the race." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (emphasis added).
87 Barbara J. Nelson, Women's Poverty and Women's Citizenship: Some
Political Consequences of Economic Marginality, 10 SiGNs 209, 229 (1984).
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In modern times, policies toward women workers continue
to reflect this view. Throughout the twentieth century, and as
recently as 1971, companies prohibited the employment of
married women, pregnant women and women with young
children." Until 1991, employers restricted women of child-
bearing age from certain occupations because they feared fetal
injury. s These cases all show society's discomfort in employ-
ing women, especially mothers, outside of the home.
Even when women are not patently prohibited from working
outside of the home, other types of discrimination also exist.
Employers have structured the typical employment relationship,
for example, with the male worker in mind. Employer-deter-
mined work schedules and benefits are not always amenable to
those who have family responsibilities. 0 Most work, and espe-
cially the most desirable work (that with better pay and benefits
and more promotional opportunities), is full-time, not part-
time.91 Benefits often are better for those who have a long,
uninterrupted job tenure. This pattern fits the typical male
worker, not the typical female worker.92 Even the items found
in a typical benefit package suit male employees better than
female employees.9" They do not include benefits such as
' In the 1920's and 30's, statutory law forced married women to leave the
workforce and prohibited them from holding certain jobs. Berquist, supra note
6, at 238. Within the last twenty years, statutes have prohibited pregnant
women from holding certain jobs, especially positions as teachers. Cleveland
Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Flight attendants have
faced the same prohibitions. See cases cited in Berman, supra note 6, at 468
n.95. As recently as 1971, a major company refused to even consider employ-
ing women with pre-school age children. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542 (1971) (a similar exclusion did not exist for men).
' Even though evidence existed that workplace hazards could also affect
fetuses through the father, the prohibition only applied to women. Automobile
Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Although this
practice was held illegal, four of the Justices concurred in the judgment
because they believed that sex-specific fetal protection policies might be
justified if the employer could show that the possible costs associated with
fetal injury were substantial. Id. at 1210. Given the recent changes in the
Court's composition, it may again uphold sex-specific fetal protection policies.
9 Knight, supra note 5, at 410-411.
91 Id.
9 Id.
' Sara Rix, Mandated Benefits and the Work/Family Dilemma or What's
a Good Congress to Do?, in GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
265, 274 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, ed., 1987).
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parental leave, paid childcare or leave for sick children; instead,
these packages contain benefits such as vacation, which employ-
ers expect to be taken all at once, rather than in many small
increments.94
The structure of the government's major employment-related
benefit program, social security, also reflects the worklife of a
man, not a woman." The government determines the amount
that a worker receives from social security upon retirement
based on a formula that looks at, among other things, length of
employment and earnings. The government developed this
formula to provide a reasonable retirement income to a worker
with a "typical" male workforce record. When a "typical" female
works for a shorter total period of time, interrupts her worklife,
and earns less than a typical male worker, she will earn signifi-
cantly less upon retirement than her male counterpart because
the male profile was used to develop the system."6 In addition,
the system favors women who work in the home over female
workers in the paid labor force.9" Thus, the structure of the
employment relationship, defined by the employer and the
government, discriminates against female workers.
This structural discrimination is apparent in attempts to
deal with the issue of parental leave within the current frame-
work of employment benefits. Many companies and states
address the need for job-protected leave by labelling pregnancy
a "disability" and providing disability leave. Under the current
male-oriented structure of the workplace, the only way to fit
pregnant women and new mothers into its definitions of "work-
' Id.; Knight, supra note 5, at 410.
9' Nelson, supra note 87, at 230; Grace Ganz Blumberg, Adult Derivative
Benefits in Social Security, 32 STAN. L. REV. 233, 244-245 (1980). Within the
structure of social benefits, there is a specious distinction made between social
security, which people incorrectly view as an earned premium paid on an
insurance policy, and welfare, which people see as a grant or hand-out. This
distinction reflects the traditional dual labor market where men "work"
outside the home and receive social security, while women provide unpaid care
and receive welfare. Nelson, supra note 87, at 221; PATEMAN, supra note 77,
at 192-194; see also infra note 129 and accompanying text.
Blumberg, supra note 95, at 244-245.
Nelson, supra note 87, at 230. A spouse who does not work in the paid
labor force can collect benefits as the dependent of a worker. When comparing
two couples who contributed the same amount to social security (one contrib-
uting through one wage earner and the other contributing through two wage
earners), the couple with one wage earner will receive more money than the
couple with two wage earners. Blumberg, supra note 95, at 247-251.
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er" and "benefits" is to treat them as imperfect or disabled
men.9" Since only women are eligible for this type of leave,
their action in taking leave makes them vulnerable to adverse
employment decisions justified by their "choice." The true
inequality in this situation "comes not from the 'natural' differ-
ences between the sexes, but from the attempt to fit women into
a workplace that was built without regard for the needs of those
with responsibility for children."99 Since both men and women
are parents, a parental leave policy avoids this problem by
redefining the workplace to include benefits which, although
benefitting primarily women, employers can apply to both sexes.
D. MARKET FAILURES ALLOWING EMPLOYERS TO DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST WOMEN
Some employers discriminate against people unconsciously.
Others consciously pay an employee more when he comes from
a favored group than they pay an equally qualified employee
from a disfavored group. These employers are said to have a
"taste" for discrimination.'" Employers act this way, not from
a desire for economic gain, but rather to satisfy nonpecuniary
preferences to associate with people of their own choosing.'
The mythology of market forces argues that any form of discrim-
ination (intentional, unconscious, or structural) should drive
employers out of business, making anti-discrimination laws
unnecessary.' 2 The free market does not work in the employ-
ment arena, however, because of various market failures.10 3
Market failures fall into two categories:'" 4 those caused by
98 Knight, supra note 5, at 420.
9 Id. at 423-424.
100 Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Employment Discrimination: An Economic
Perspective, 19 OTTAWA L. REV. 275, 280 (1987). See generally GARY S.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
101 See POSNER, supra note 53, at 615; Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the
Market Place, 43 N.C. L. Rev. 271, 272 (1965).
1See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
103 Cf Richard B. Freeman, Decline of Labor Market Discrimination and
Economic Analysis, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 280, 284 (1973) (labor market reasons
are inadequate to explain the long-term nature of employment discrimination
against blacks and the sudden change in the extent of discrimination).
104 Firms which are not subject to market forces, such as natural monopo-
lies and those in the public sector, also may discriminate without fear of
economic repercussions. Macintosh, supra note 100, at 300-301.
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government regulation and those caused by management choic-
es.
In the absence of government regulation, a firm seeks to
maximize its profits by holding down costs. These costs include
labor and a normal economic profit or return for the entrepre-
neur. In order to secure employment, a prospective employee
from a disfavored group may offer her labor at a lower price
than one from the favored group. Government regulation
affects this behavior in several ways by allowing an employer to
indulge his taste for discrimination. In certain regulated indus-
tries, the government caps the amount of profit which a firm
may make. In these circumstances, the firm no longer has an
incentive to limit its costs. It may spend more to hire someone
from the favored group, and the government still may allow the
firm to receive the same profit.' °5 Alternately, a minimum
wage law prevents employees from lowering their price, so a
discriminating employer can hire someone from a favored group
for the same wage as someone from a disfavored group. 10 6
These regulations, then, prevent market forces from acting
against the discriminating employer.
There are also a variety of management choices which lead
to market failures. Some employers (those receiving the cost-
savings associated with having a share workforce) have found
that the wage at which they maximize their profits is above the
lowest wage that they could pay employees and still hire them.
They buy labor at their "efficiency wage." Since this efficiency
wage is highly relative to what prospective employees are
willing to accept, they can hire employees from their preferred
group. °7 A similar situation exists anytime there is more
than one equally qualified candidate willing to work for the
same wage. The employer is free to discriminate in this situa-
tion. 08
Additionally, in many companies the person making the
hiring decision is removed from the discipline of the market-
'05 This situation describes most public utilities, including railroads.
Demsetz, supra note 101, at 279.
"o Id. at 275; Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 235, 250 (1971).
107 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination, 63
AMER. ECON. REV. 287, 290 (1973).
108 Id.
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place.1" 9 Thus, a management that chooses to delegate hiring
decisions to lower levels allows the hiring manager to indulge
his taste for discrimination over pecuniary needs. A large
company can absorb the higher costs because it considers a
certain amount of "unexplained" loss normal and probably due
to bureaucracy and decentralized management." 0 The separa-
tion of ownership and control in large companies, where share-
holders are removed from and lack power over day-to-day
operations, exacerbates this tendency."' A final management
choice is simply to take a lower, but still positive, economic
profit."2 Entrepreneurs are able to do this when they face
relatively weak competitive forces. This is the purest case of
sating nonpecuniary tastes over economic ones.
Some commentators argue that employers decide not to hire
women or people of color by the use of "rational" or "statistical"
discrimination - generalizations about these groups which may
be inaccurate for individuals, but provide an easy and inexpen-
sive screening tool for the majority of applicants. For example,
employers may assume that women are more likely to quit
because of their family responsibilities and so may not invest in
their hiring and training. Recent data suggest, however, that
men and women in comparable jobs, with comparable qualifica-
tions, do not have different turnover rates.13  The State Pa-
rental Leave Study found that 85% of mothers returned to work
for the same employer following their leave."4 Additionally,
statistical discrimination must be rejected; the social inefficie-
ncies caused by discrimination outweigh any cost savings netted
by the discriminating firm."5 Finally, even if employers could
109 Fiss, supra note 106, at 250. This situation also exists when union
hiring halls are used. Id. at 251.
110 Macintosh, supra note 100, at 300-301.
I" Id. at 301-303. The shareholders, not the employees, are the ones who
are economically hurt when the company is not profitable.
112 Fiss, supra note 106, at 250; Macintosh, supra note 100, at 300-301.
113 RHODE, supra note 80, at 169.
14 This figure was the same, both before and after the passage of mandato-
ry parental leave laws. BOND, supra note 13, at 70-71.
115 If all members of a group are assumed to have a certain undesirable
characteristic and are employed and paid accordingly, individuals in that
group have no incentive to act differently from the stereotype or to invest in
human capital to overcome the stereotype. For example, if mothers receive
less pay because employers assume they will miss work when their children
are ill, there is no incentive for any individual mother to make other arrange-
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save money by discriminating, cost savings alone do not justify
breaking equal employment or other laws." 6
Mechanisms clearly exist enabling employers to discrimi-
nate in hiring without market forces driving them out of busi-
ness. Since employers use benefits to attract prospective em-
ployees, employers who do not wish to hire certain groups
simply will not offer the benefits which would attract members
of that group. Market forces do not punish firms for not recruit-
ing certain employees anymore than they punish them for not
hiring these workers. An employer who does not want to hire
women can avoid doing so by paying more to hire men. In that
case, the employer would have no incentive to implement a
benefit, such as parental leave, designed to attract and retain
women. The entire crux of market failure analysis is that
employers are, in many cases, free to ignore market forces
militating against discrimination in recruiting and hiring.
Statistical evidence, the history of female workers, and the
current structure of the workplace all show that employers do
discriminate against women. Only legislation will prevent
employers who want to discriminate from doing so.
III. MYTH THREE: "[THESE POLICES] MUST BE...
CRAFTED AT THE WORK PLACE BY EMPLOYERS
AND EMPLOYEES, AND NOT THROUGH GOVERNMENT
MANDATES IMPOSED BY LEGISLATION. '' 7
Thus far, this article has analyzed two of the myths under-
lying the President's veto of the Family & Medical Leave Act:
its costs would hamper American companies and market mecha-
nisms will lead naturally to parental leave. A third myth lies
implicit in the President's disdain for "mandated" benefits. 8
He believes that the government does not have the right to
interfere with benefit provision, which he views as "traditionally
... within the purview of employer-employee negotiation," as
ments when her child is ill. Similarly, if women do not receive promotions
because employers assume they have no interest in a "career," individual
women have no incentive to invest in the training or education necessary for
advancement. Thus, the stereotypes lead to socially inefficient behavior by
members of the disadvantaged group. Donohue, supra note 79, at 1356-1358.
116 Brodin, supra note 53, at 323, 357-365.
,1 Veto Message, supra note 1, at 891.
118 Press Conference, supra note 51, at 846.
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opposed to "government mandate.""1 9 In reality, our society
has chosen the workplace to deliver social welfare benefits. To
a large extent, society has rejected the possibilities of individual
responsibility or state provision of social benefits. Following
from this decision, mandatory job-protected parental leave is
proper and consistent with the American social welfare system.
After describing the current American benefits delivery system,
this section will show why benefits provided by the private
sector are properly categorized as either public or social bene-
fits. Finally, this section will examine some advantages of this
delivery system: the linkage of demands for benefits to econom-
ic constraints and the ability to offset some of the harshness of
the labor market.
A. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR DELIVERY OF SOCIAL WELFARE
BENEFITS
In most other countries, social welfare benefits are provided
by the government and financed through taxes. The United
States, however, has chosen a different system to meet these
needs.12 The U.S. has opted for a system where social bene-
fits are predominantly provided for working people through the
employment relationship and are closely regulated by the
government. The general population depends primarily on a tie
to the workplace, not the government, for basic forms of protec-
tion against financial insecurity. 1 ' The formation of this type
of delivery system has surprised social scientists studying
societal provision of welfare benefits. Until recently, these
scholars assumed that all countries would move eventually to
governmental programs to cover accident, retirement, sickness,
unemployment, family allowance and public assistance for low-
11 Veto Message, supra note 1, at 891.
'o Theda Skocpol & John Ikenberry, The Political Formation of the
American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 6 COMP.
SOC. RES. 87, 89-91 (1983).
12' PUBLIC/PRIVATE INTERPLAY IN SOCIAL PROTECTION: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 14-15 (Martin Rein & Lee Rainwater eds., 1986) [hereinafter "Rein and
Rainwater"]; Stevens, supra note 49, at 64.
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income people. 1" The United States, however, has resisted
this evolution."
A description of the current welfare benefits system shows
that the American benefits delivery system tends to be market-
based, as opposed to government-based. Private enterprise
provides approximately one-quarter of all social welfare benefits;
the highest percentage of non-governmental expenditures in the
world." Social benefits include the satisfaction of any com-
mon need, such as medical care, schools and roads, and more
specific needs based on incapacity to work, unavailability of
work or inadequacy of wages." Private sources pay for twen-
ty percent of income maintenance programs and over half of
health insurance expenditures. 26 The fact that the United
States is the only country in the world in which private health
insurance is the principal source of medical protection, drama-
tizes the unique character of the American system. 2'
The two-pronged American delivery system provides bene-
fits considered "voluntary" and those that are legally required.
Although the government does not require employers to provide
the voluntary benefits (i.e. vacation, medical insurance, pen-
sions), it provides incentives to do so and closely regulates their
provision. 8 The cornerstone of mandatory benefits is social
security.'29 The employer-based delivery system appeals to
"' Theda Skocpol, The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of
Contemporary Welfare Dilemmas, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 293 n.1 (Margaret Weir et al. eds. 1988).
'2 Id. at 293-295.
" Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 17 (22.9%); Stevens, supra note
49, at 2 (over 25%).
Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 30, 33.
's Stevens, supra note 49, at 2.
127 Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 51.
"s See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. The Government has
encouraged and shaped "voluntary" benefits from their outset. These benefits
came into existence during World War II as a way to increase compensation
to employees whose wages the War Labor Board "froze." LAWRENCE S. ROOT,
FRINGE BENEFITS: SOCIAL INSURANCE IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY, 43-44 (1982).
At the same time, the government was taxing "excess profits." Companies
could choose to invest their "excess profits" in nontaxable benefits (which could
improve labor relations) and still receive the same actual profit. Stevens,
supra note 49, at 19.
"' Upon introduction of the program, President Roosevelt attempted to
disguise the governmental nature of it by calling it an "entitlement" program.
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the public because the absence of governmental expenditure
makes it appear "free."'13  These characteristics all reflect
American society's belief in the myth of the free market and its
desire to have a market-based, as opposed to government-based,
system to provide welfare benefits.3
Although the American benefit delivery system relies
primarily on the private sector, the government is heavily
involved in regulating the employment relationship.'32 The
myth of "private employment" ignores the extent of govenment
regulation." Indeed, there is a huge amount of social and
The President characterized the program as "insurance," with "premiums"
paid on workers' "contributions" in order to distinguish the program, in public
opinion, from welfare. Wilbur J. Cohen, The Development of the Social
Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years Later, 68 MINN. L. REV.
379, 398 (1983). He also insisted that the program be financed by a payroll
tax in an attempt to make it politically invulnerable to future attack as a
private deal. Id. at 385. The other mandatory benefits are unemployment
compensation, workers compensation, minimum wage, premium wage, and job-
protected jury and military leaves.
m3 ROOT, supra note 128, at 200; Deborah Chollet, Public Policy Options to
Expand Health Insurance Coverage Among the Nonelderly Population, in
GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 91, 94 (1987). This
appearance is false, however, because the costs are borne by the public
through other mechanisms.
m, Skocpol & Ikenberry, supra note 120, at 134-136.
James A. Burstein & Jeri A. Lindahl, The Practical Labor Lawyer --
Parental-Medical Leave: A New Trend in Labor Legislation, 14 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 299, 300 (1988); Gimler, supra note 6, at 601-602.
' It regulates the hours and wages of employment through the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990). The regulation of
work conditions which affect health and safety occurs through the Occupation-
al Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988). Job-protected leave is
mandatory for jury duty, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988), and military service, 38
U.S.C. § 2021(bX3) (1988). Discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment is regulated by many laws including Title VII, the Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206(dX1) (1988), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990), and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1991). The regulation of the employ-
ment of non-citizens occurs through the Immigration & Naturalization Service
through many laws, including the Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986
(IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988 & Supp II 1991). Benefits are regulated by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453
(1988 & Supp. I 1990), the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1985 (COBRA) Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1985), Internal Revenue Code
§ 162(k). The tax laws provide an example of the extent of government policy.
By not taxing benefits as income in 1979, for example, the government forwent
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governmental control at the intersection of public and private
social benefits policy. The government constrains individual
consumption by limiting the type of purchases made and their
timing. The government also regulates the free negotiation of
labor contracts; social programs which encourage people to
work, so that production continues; and social programs which
control political mobilization and protest by keeping the public
satisfied."M The government also demonstrates an interest in
children and quality care through tax deductions for dependent
children, tax breaks for childcare and the recognition of family
as a protected interest in equal protection/due process analy-
sis.1" Given the intensity of government involvement in the
employment relationship and its interest in the family, it is
difficult to say that mandatory job-protected parental leave
would significantly increase the government's involvement in
issues not within its purview.
B. EMPLOYER PROVIDED BENEFITS: HALFWAY BETWEEN A
RIGHT AND A REWARD
Even though employers' expenditures are "private," they
have many "social" characteristics in addition to the social
nature of the goods and services which they provide. Within the
work group, they are nonelective, and the costs and benefits are
socialized or collectivized, rather than determined by an individ-
ual bargain or quid-pro-quo. 3 6 They are a product of the con-
stant interaction between governmental and private institu-
tions. '3 Finally, like taxes and other governmental programs,
approximately $20 billion. ROOT, supra note 128, at 189. This amount was
larger than the expenditures for Aid for Families with Dependent Children
and Medicaid combined. Id. An example of an alternative program would be
to tax these benefits and use the money to provide health care for low income
people. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Should All Employers Be Required by Law to
Provide Basic Health Insurance Coverage for their Employees and Depen-
dents?, in GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 121, 131 (Em-
ployee Benefit Research Institute, ed., 1987).
13 Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 20-23.
Bergquist, supra note 6, at 257.
ROOT, supra note 128, at 15; Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 26.
17 Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 18-19; see also supra notes 136-
148 and accompanying text.
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they arrange or manage consumer sovereignty by restricting the
type of purchases and the time of consumption.'"
By providing these benefits, employers take responsibility
for certain social obligations unrelated to work or produc-
tion.'3 9 Although many categorize "fringe benefits" as wages,
they are not compensation for services but rather payments for
social, nonwork needs. 1' Employers gave paid vacation, the
first fringe benefit, not in response to requests for increased
wages, but to provide time off to rest, relax and socialize.'41
Unions suggested the framework of viewing benefits as compen-
sation for services, and arbitrators adopted the framework to
give a legal claim to payment for terminal vacation pay.'
Characterizing fringe benefits as payment for services is harm-
ful, however, because it disguises the true nature of the Ameri-
can delivery system of social benefits.'"
When employers began to provide health benefits to fami-
lies, benefit coverage extended to nonworkers for the first time.
In 1980, for example, employer-provided health insurance
covered more dependents than employees.' This develop-
ment also expanded the definition of proper remuneration from
payment given to individual workers based on their work
performance to something that acknowledged and provided for
circumstances outside the workplace. 45 An additional catego-
ry of non-workers who receive benefits are retirees, who receive
them not as remuneration, but based on their employers accep-
tance of responsibility to provide for them even after they cease
13 Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 9. The programs generally
restrict spending by employees during their mid-life years in which they are
healthy in order to ensure that they have money in the event of retirement,
sickness, unemployment, or disability.
m9 DONNA ALLEN, FRINGE BENEFITS: WAGES OR SOCIAL OBLIGATION 267
(1969).
" An entitlement should only be characterized as part of the market
relationship if it has as a basis current labor. If its basis is past labor or
citizenship rights, then it is a social or collective provision. Rein & Rainwater,
supra note 121, at 29.
41 ALLEN, supra note 139, at 186.
'MId. at 198.
14 3 Id. at 199.
1' The ratio was 1.62:1. Stevens, supra note 49, at 36.
145 Id.
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to work.146 Employers also provide unemployment compensa-
tion and benefits to laid off employees; representing both the
obligation of employers to former employees who left work
through no fault of their own and the reality that the workplace
is the major port of access to benefits.147 Clearly, compensa-
tion and benefits are no longer strictly wages paid in return for
production. They provide for the social needs of both workers
and people outside the workforce.
Society's view that privately supplied social benefits substi-
tute for government-sponsored benefits reinforces the relation-
ship between the public and private sectors. Private benefits
become de facto social policy." Their existence can become a
roadblock to public sector attempts to provide similar social
welfare benefits.'49 As private benefits expand, the pressure
to provide more or better public benefits decreases. 50 This
scenario is particularly true among those who receive benefits
from their employers and who therefore do not perceive a need
for better government-provided benefits.' Employers also do
not press for better social benefits as they prefer to provide
fringe benefits to prevent the expansion of government-provided,
publicly-funded programs."'
There are two losers in this situation: the unemployed and
those whose employers do not provide benefits. Those people
who are most in need of social insurance protection are the ones
least likely to get protection through the workplace." These
people tend to be unemployed, low-paid, unskilled, non-white
and female."M Part of the problem originates in the shift to
the use of contingent workers by employers. The labor force is
changing, but the social welfare system has not kept up with
the changes to insure that these workers receive basic welfare
guarantees." Thus, the current structure for providing bene-
146 Id. at 36-37, 61, 62.
147 Id. at 37, 62.
148 See id. at v.
149 See id. at 3; ROOT, supra note 128, at 203.
150 ROOT, supra note 128, at 188.
151 Id. at 197.
152 ALLEN, supra note 139, at 261.
3 ROOT, supra note 128, at 187.
... Id. at 196.
155 BELOUS, supra note 41, at 12.
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fits leaves out those most in need of parental leave, while
simultaneously acting as a barrier for increased governmental
provision of social benefits. 5 '
The United States has made the unique decision to use the
employment relationship to deliver social welfare benefits. This
system only covers those who have some connection to the
workplace and works well only for those whose connection is to
an employer who provides good benefits. Because of these
problems, a government-sponsored program that covered tempo-
rary workers and people who perform nonmarket household
work would, in fact, be preferable. However, such a program is
not politically feasible; the current system works to frustrate the
expansion of government-provided benefits to those who are not
receiving them through the private sector. Mandating job-
protected parental leave is a significant and attainable first step
toward universal coverage. It would provide an important
benefit to employees who tend to be left out in the current
benefits scheme, would be consistent with the use of the employ-
ment relationship to provide benefits; and would not, as Presi-
dent Bush suggested, involve the government in something
considered traditionally outside its purview.
C. THE WORKPLACE AS THE PROPER Locus FOR PROVIDING
SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS
Society's decision to use the employment relationship to
provide social welfare benefits has two major advantages. First,
this benefits delivery system contains inherent limits; the
demands for resources are connected to and limited by the
business realities of the entities which produce those resources.
Additionally, the system is sound politically because it provides
a counterbalance to the harshness of an economic system which
relies on the commodification of labor. The employment rela-
tionship is more than providing wages for work. It is an inte-
gral part of the social and political system. As such, the provi-
sion of benefits through this relationship (mandatorily, if they
do not arrive voluntarily) is necessary for the stability of the
system.
" Providing for these social needs is no longer seen as properly borne by
the individual. ALLEN, supra note 139, at 260-261.
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By their very nature, employment benefits are tied to the
workplace. Although not compensation for work performed,'
they are developed within and delivered through the framework
of the employment relationship. The benefits offered are subject
to business considerations and motivated by employee
demands.'58 These competing forces result in the provision of
benefits, a result characterized as "halfway between a reward
and a right."'5 9 Their provision is subject to both humanitari-
an social policy concerns and business considerations. 60 If
the workplace does not provide these benefits, the limits im-
posed by business considerations dissipate. If social claims for
resources are divorced from the nation's economic capacity to
meet them, the constraints on the ability to meet such demands
are not directly perceived or understood.' 6 ' Thus, the
workplace nexus is necessary to provide rational limits and
constraints on the demand for social benefits.
The nature of the employment relationship also makes the
workplace the appropriate locus for social benefits. Employment
is more than providing work in exchange for wages. It is an
integral part of the social and political order of the country.
People must work to keep the economy flourishing. The govern-
ment structures national social policies to encourage people to
work. Indeed, the creation of national markets requires that
there be a market for labor and that the market consider indivi-
duals' labor a commodity.'62 The commodification of labor,
however, results in extreme hardship for those who are super-
fluous to the labor market."s Society is unwilling to accept
the abandonment of these individuals, and consequently devel-
ops arrangements to protect them from the harshness of the
human labor market."M Thus, the development of social bene-
157 See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
See Stevens, supra note 49, at 3-4.
'5 Id. at 1.
160 Id. at vi.
11 Michael J. Piore, 1 Post-Reaganomics: The Resurgence of the Social
Sphere in Economic and Political Life? 17 (Jan. 1989) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy).
162 Fred Block & Margaret R. Somers, Beyond the Economistic Fallacy:
The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi, in VISION AND METHOD IN
HISTORICAL SOcIOLOGY 47, 54 (Theda Skocpol ed., 1984).
"6 Rein & Rainwater, supra note 121, at 32.
164 See Block & Somers, supra note 162, at 65; Rein & Rainwater, supra
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fits within the employment relationship is an attempt to deal
with the inherent contradictions of the commodification of labor.
Society wants a market system, but it is unwilling to accept the
fact that the market makes no adjustment for human
needs." The labor market cannot exist without the provision
of social benefits to guard against the negative effects of that
market. Since the social political order requires a labor market,
the provision of benefits is also necessary."
CONCLUSION
Q. Mr. President, during the campaign you said often
that we've got to find a way that people who have
children won't be threatened with the loss of their jobs,
and now you're saying that that has to be a voluntary
position on the part of employers to give parental leave.
How does that fulfill your campaign promise for people
who work for employers who won't give voluntary leave,
and what do you have to say to those people?
The President. You've got to keep working for them
until they do because my campaign promise did not go
to what they call mandated benefits.16
Some people, including President Bush, have opposed
legislation guaranteeing job protected parental leave to all
workers. Most people, including the President, have agreed that
such leave is necessary to provide all parents, but primarily new
mothers, time to bond with and nuture their children without
suffering severe economic and career problems. Arguments
against job-protected parental leave focus instead upon three
basic myths: that the costs of mandatory leave would make it
note 121, at 33. These works, describing the theory of Karl Polanyi, contend
that society will not tolerate the hardship because of humanitarian concerns.
A more cynical explanation is that these benefits must be provided to keep
people content and to ensure political stability.
'" Block & Somers, supra note 162, at 57-58; Rein & Rainwater, supra
note 121, at 33.
16 In an ideal world, the nonmarket work provided by women would
receive acknowledgement and benefits provided accordingly. See generally,
Pateman, supra note 77. Similarly, all employees, including temporary
employees, would receive these benefits.
16 Press Conference, supra note 51, at 979.
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impossible for American companies to compete internationally
and to create jobs; that market forces naturally will move
employers to provide appropriate leave options; and that the
government should not interfere in the field of employer-provid-
ed benefits. Although these myths have strong appeal, they
prove false when subjected to close scrutiny.
Studies in states that have adopted mandatory parental
leave show that a company's ability to do business has not been
impaired. Employers in four of these states overwhelmingly
reported that they did not experience difficulty in implementing
the statute. Mandatory leave did not increase administrative,
training, unemployment insurance or health benefit costs for the
great majority of the employers. Costs did not increase because
employers were able to cover leaves by using temporary employ-
ees. The availability and use of temporary employees has
skyrocketed because temporary employees cost less to employ
and require less commitment than regular workers. Thus, the
growth of the temporary workforce enables employers to pro-
vide job-protected parental leave without increasing their costs
or interfering with their ability to compete.
Even though parental leave is not costly to implement, the
free market has not moved the majority of employers to provide
it. Adverse selection may mean parental leave is costly if only
some employers provide it. Alternately, by hiring contingent
workers who do not require leave, employers may have found a
different, equally profitable management strategy. Another
reason employers do not provide parental leave may be that
employers discriminate against women. Market failures, caused
by government regulation and management policy, allow em-
ployers to satisfy these discriminatory, nonpecuniary prefer-
ences without being driven out of business. Employers nonpecu-
niary preferences include a desire not to employ women, who
they view primarily as wives and mothers, not workers. Empir-
ically, then, the assumption that market forces will move
employers towards providing parental leave has proven false.
Also false is the myth that the area of benefit provision is
outside the government's purview. In the United States, gov-
ernment and "private employment" are inextricably intertwined
in the provision of social welfare benefits. Unlike all other
countries in the world, American society has chosen to use the
employment relationship to deliver social benefits which other
governments generally provide. The employer has assumed
responsibility for providing benefits unrelated to production and
to people not in the workforce. Meanwhile, the government's
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role has been to regulate, encourage, and shape these benefits.
This system beneficially links demands for resources to resource
production and provides a stabilizing counterbalance to the
harshness of the labor market. Unfortunately, this delivery
system only provides these benefits to those with a connection
to the workforce and whose employers provide sufficient bene-
fits. Mandatory job-protected parental leave could start to help
correct the inequities in the current benefit delivery system by
extending an important social benefit to the group of workers
who is currently most likely to be excluded: working mothers.

